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The Problem with Naïve (Doctrinal) Empiricism
Traditional view of philosophical positions:
Principle Zero (van Fraassen 2002, 41)
For each philosophical position X there exists a statement X+ such
that to have (or take) position X is to believe (or decide to believe)
that X+.
In the case of empiricism, adopting Principle Zero leads to a
reductio ad absurdum of naïve empiricism (ibid., 42–46):
X+ would be something like “Experience is the one and only
source of information”.
At the same time, empiricism holds that no factual claim can
be ruled out a priori.
Thus, if X+ is understood as a factual claim, metaphysical
claims contradicting it cannot be ruled out!
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From Doctrines to Stances
Van Fraassen (2002, 47–48) therefore rejects Principle Zero:
A philosophical position can consist in something other than a belief in what
the world is like. . . . [It] can consist in a stance (attitude, commitment,
approach, a cluster of such—possibly including some propositional attitudes
such as beliefs as well).
Key characteristics of the empirical stance
1 a rejection of demands for explanation at certain crucial points,
2 a strong dissatisfaction with explanations (even if called for)
that proceed by postulation. (ibid., 37)
3 As in science, so in philosophy: disagreement with any
admissible factual hypothesis is admissible. (43)
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An Alternative Stance: Materialism
For naïve materialism, X+ might be “Matter is all there is”.
(ibid., 49)
Although naïve materialism may not be subject to a similar
reductio as naïve empiricism, it is either empty or likely to be
falsified by future science.
Therefore, materialism (just like empiricism) should be
understood as a stance, not as a doctrine.
The materialist stance
In contrast to empiricism (which primarily admires the methods of
the empirical sciences), materialism is characterized by “a certain
deference to the content of science. This deference takes two
forms: the belief that the scientific description of the world is true, in
its entirety or near enough, and at least a strong inclination toward
completeness claims for the content of certain sciences.” (62–63)
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Stances and Metaphysics
Even before one endorses the empirical (or any other
anti-metaphysical) stance, there is an anti-metaphysical element in
the very move from philosophical doctrines to stances.
To agree with van Fraassen that philosophical positions ought to be stances
rather than doctrines is to suppose that there is value in some philosophy,
somehow conceived, but not in strong metaphysics. (Ladyman and Ross
2007, 60)
Strong vs. weak metaphysics
While strong metaphysics is concerned with “non-trivial doctrinal
beliefs about the structure of the world that go beyond what the
sciences tell us or imply” (ibid.), the propositions of weak
metaphysics “should be understood not as doctrines but as
proposed provisional commitments for living out the stance” (65).
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Scientific (or Naturalized) Metaphysics
In the context of Ladyman’s and Ross’s (henceforth “L&R”)
scientistic stance (see below), weak metaphysics becomes “the
articulation of a unified world-view derived from the details of
scientific research” (ibid.).
(2007) (2013)
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Is Weak Metaphysics Really Less Doctrinal?
We can say ‘go in peace’ to Heideggerians, noting that it was entirely
appropriate that Heidegger did not attempt to base any elements of his
philosophy on science, and focused on hammers . . . rather than atoms
. . . when he reflected on objects. We, however, are interested in objective
truth rather than philosophical anthropology. Our quarrel will be with
philosophers who claim to share this interest, but then fail properly to pay
attention to our basic source of information about objective reality. (L&R
2007, 5)
This contradicts the non-doctrinal rhetoric of weak metaphysics:
If the scientistic stance is concerned with objective truth in a
sense in which other stances are not, how do its propositions
differ from the doctrines of strong metaphysics?
Nor are these propositions mere “provisional commitments”:
L&R endorse structural realism as “a defensible basis for
. . . viewing the history of science as a history of progressive
accumulation of knowledge” (65).
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Metaphysics and Conversion
L&R (2007, 64) on how to engage with people who resist adopting
the scientistic stance:
Their resistance to science, which must be quite thoroughgoing if it is not to
be unprincipled, will confront them with serious policy problems in the
management of social affairs, and we will want to press them as hard as
possible on these. But we would not try to convert them with metaphysics, for
van Fraassen is right that that would require strong metaphysics, and strong
metaphysics can’t get off the ground.
However, even weak metaphysics can be put to the service of
converting people:
The best motivation for trying to synthesize our scientific knowledge into a
unified picture—that is, for building naturalistic metaphysics—is the crucial
service this activity potentially performs in extending the Enlightenment
project. If science is not seen to provide the basis for a general worldview,
then people will continue to collectively confabulate alternative general
pictures. This in turn matters because the confabulated pictures inspire
groundless and usually wasteful and destructive politics and policy. (L&R
2013, 113)
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Interim Conclusion
On closer inspection, weak metaphysics turns out to produce
statements that are purported to be objectively true, just as the
doctrines of strong metaphysics.
This suggests that the distinction between weak and strong
metaphysics is largely irrelevant to the task of defending
metaphysics against van Fraassen’s critique.
If scientific metaphysics is to have any advantage over its
predecessors, it must consist in its being “derived from the
details of scientific research”.
The contrast is then no longer between weak and strong
metaphysics, but between different kinds of weak
metaphysics, based on different stances.
This raises the question as to how stances can be evaluated
against each other.
Stances and the Critique of Metaphysics Scientific Metaphysics Evaluating the Scientistic Stance
Pessimism about the Ranking of Stances
Problem: Stances are incommensurable
insofar as each of them comes with its
own set of values.
Since rationality is the only stance-neutral
criterion for the acceptability of a stance,
there are no further grounds on which to
prosecute a non-question-begging case for
the epistemic superiority of one over
another; they are, qua rationality, the only
relevant measure, “equally strong”.
(Chakravartty 2017, 243)
Chakravartty discusses three stances
(“deflationary”, “empiricist” and
“metaphysical”). Since they all count as
rational (internally coherent), he finds
none of them superior to the others.
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The Scientistic (= empirical + materialist) Stance
Conjecture: Chakravartty’s irenic judgment on stances stems from
the simplicity of his examples. As soon as stances involve richer
combinations of commitments, a more substantive evaluation in
terms of internal coherence becomes possible.
Example: L&R’s scientistic stance
So we really are, in detail, both perfect empiricists and perfect materialists
according to van Fraassen’s criteria. Note that this cannot be diagnosed as
implying doctrinal self-contradiction, for that is a charge that is inappropriate
to stances. (L&R 2007, 63)
Van Fraassen (2011, 167–8) mentions some ways in which
L&R’s stance can nevertheless fail to be internally coherent.
Even doctrinal self-contradictions can be important by
indicating an internal incoherence of the corresponding
stance, as the following case study shows.
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The Scientistic Stance in Quantum Mechanics (QM)
The measurement problem
QM provides some highly reliable rules for the (probabilistic)
prediction of measurement outcomes, but it is notoriously unclear
what counts as a ‘measurement’ and
how these rules of prediction relate to the way physical
systems behave when no measurement is performed.
This generates a dilemma for the scientistic stance:
Interpretations and modifications of QM proposed in response
to the measurement problem often make metaphysical
assumptions (additional variables, many worlds, collapse
dynamics) which the empiricist should reject.
Proposals without such assumptions tend towards a kind of
antirealism that is in tension with the materialist stance.
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L&R’s Unsuccessful Attempt to Escape the Dilemma
Referring to Niels Bohr, L&R (2007; 2013) claim that one can avoid
the unduly metaphysical solutions to the measurement problem
without falling into antirealism. The idea is to simply refuse to give
any account of ‘measurement’.
The dilemma resurfaces
Does an unobserved, measurement-like process yield a unique
result?
If so, this means that quantum superpositions sometimes
disappear spontaneously (but real spontaneous collapses are
hardly acceptable for the empiricist).
If not, this either means that the presence of an observer
changes physical processes (in contradiction to materialism)
or that the universe is full of unobservable quantum
superpositions (abhorrent to the empiricist).
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Conclusion
Of course, alternative approaches to the measurement
problem are imaginable within the scientistic stance, but the
impossibility of simultaneously satisfying empiricist and
materialist demands seems pervasive.
So why not rest content with one of the two components
(especially if rationality is “the only relevant measure”)?
For anyone sensitive to the critique of metaphysics, giving up
empiricism in favour of a speculative materialism is not viable.
But empiricism alone does not seem to provide a sufficiently
unified view of the world and ourselves in it. Is this the reason
for the prominent role of religion in The Empirical Stance?
As for secularists like L&R, the desire for a unified worldview
pushes them towards adding the materialist to the empirical
stance. The threat of incoherence seems to be the price to be
paid for this move.
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